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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN STATES
BROADCASTING COMPANY,
a corporation, and DAN
LACY, an individual,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No.

880192-CA

vs.
Category 14b
STERRETT NEALE and NEALE
BROADCAST ALLIANCE,
DefendantsRespondents .

PETITION
Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, plaintiffs-appellants hereby petition the Court for a
rehearing of this case.
the Court erred

The ground for this petition is that

in holding

as a matter of law that Neale

Broadcast Alliance was the prevailing party and thus the only
party entitled to recover its attorney fees.
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition
is presented in good faith and not for delay.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEALE BROADCAST ALLIANCE'S COUNTERCLAIM
DID NOT INCREASE ITS RECOVERY,
AND IT IS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY.
The Court holds, on page 9 of its opinion, that Neale
Broadcast Alliance
recovered

the

(NBA) was the prevailing party because it

net

judgment.

submits that this conclusion
reasons:

Mountain

States

is in error

respectfully

for at least two

First, Mountain States deposited the full amount due

under the promissory note prior to the time that NBA filed any
counterclaim.

Second, the "net judgment" rule should not be

applied to a declaratory judgment action where the full amount
of the note was not due when suit was filed, where the plaintiff
deposited the full amount due into court, and where not all of
the amount "recovered" by defendant was disputed.
Mountain States1 deposited the entire unpaid balance due
under the promissory note into court, and sought a declaratory
judgment that Mountain States was entitled to certain offsets
and claimed that NBA had breached
under the contracts.

certain other obligations

NBA's Counterclaim sought (1) payment of

the amount due under the note, which Mountain States had already
deposited into court, and (2) punitive damages of $50,000.00.
The

judgment

in

this

case

awarded

certain

offsets

to

Mountain States, and ordered that the corrected balance due
under the promissory note be paid to NBA, all in accordance with
Mountain States1

complaint.

NBA was denied the affirmative
2

relief it sought, in that its request for punitive damages was
denied.
Based on these facts, this Court held that NBA had a net
recovery of approximately $85,000, and that NBA was the prevailing party.
Carried to its logical extreme, the rule established by
this Court would also mean that NBA would have been the prevailing party even if Mountain States had established a right to an
$89,000 offset, yielding a net judgment to NBA of $1,000.00.
The rule in essence means that the payor under a promissory note
can never be a prevailing party in litigation under the note.
Several factors dictate that such a mechanical rule should
not be applied in this case.

First, although Mountain States

deposited the entire unpaid balance into court at the time it
filed its complaint, the note was not then due.1

The note was

amortized over ten years, with the final payment due June 30,
1992.
A

second

factor

is that Mountain

States deposited

the

unpaid balance into court at the time it filed its complaint,
and not in response to a counterclaim from NBA.
In Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034
(Utah 1981) , the case relied upon by the Court in this case as

X

NBA asserted in its Answer and Counterclaim that it had
declared the entire unpaid balance to be due.
There was no
evidence that NBA had accelerated the note prior to the time
that Mountain States made its deposit.
(Three notices of
default were admitted into evidence, but none purport to
accelerate the note. (Exhibits 71, 78, 79.)
3

support for the proposition that money voluntarily paid during
litigation should be treated as obtained by judgment, the facts
were much different.

The Court there stated as follows:

Highland claims to be "the prevailing
party" because 164 days after it filed this
action and while this action was pending in
the court below, Stevenson admitted that he
owed and he voluntarily paid Highland
$10,300.78 of the amount it was suing for.
...
It should make no difference whether
the plaintiff recovers money from the
defendant during the course of the action by
voluntary payment or whether the plaintiff
recovers that amount by a judgment. In both
instances the plaintiff has recovered money
by virtue of its action. See Joseph Maanin
Co., Inc. v. Schmidt, 152 Cal.Rptr. 523, 89
C.A.3d Supp. 7 (1978). In the instant case,
the $10,3 00.78 was long past due when paid
by Stevenson and since it was paid, albeit
voluntarily, after plaintiff's action was
commenced the plaintiff Highland was indeed
the prevailing party" on that particular
cause of action.
636 P.2d

at 1038.

In Joseph Macrnin, cited in Highland, it

similarly appears that the debt was past due at the time suit
was

filed, and the award

of attorney

fees was based

on a

specific statute somewhat similar to Utah R. Civ. P. 68(a).
In the instant case, in contrast, the sums paid by Mountain
States were not "voluntarily" paid during the pendency of the
suit—they were paid before suit, at the time the complaint was
filed.

In addition, the sums were not "long past due," but in

fact would not have become due for several years.

Mountain

States attempted to show its good faith by depositing the full
balance due into court.

Such deposits should be encouraged as a

4

matter of policy.

Under this Court's ruling, there would be no

incentive to make such a deposit.
The "net judgment" rule may be appropriate in cases similar
to those cited by this Court in support of the rule.

For

example, in Ocean West Contractors, Inc. v. Halec Construction
Co. , 123 Ariz. 470, 600 P.2d 1102 (1979), the plaintiff (subcontractor)

sued the defendant

(general contractor)

for the

unpaid balance claimed to be due under a construction subcontract, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages for the
plaintiff's

failure to complete the subcontract.

The trial

court found that the plaintiff had breached the contract first,
but awarded both parties some relief.

The net judgment was in

favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was therefore awarded
its costs and attorney fees.
In Ocean West, therefore, and in the other cases cited by
this Court in support of the "net judgment" rule, the claims
arose out of the same transaction, but were dissimilar.

(The

plaintiff sued for the unpaid balance due; the defendant sued
for damages for failure to complete.)
contrast,

the

defendant's

plaintiffs' complaint.

In the instant case, in

"counterclaim"

was

identical

to

With the exception of defendant's claim

for punitive damages, defendant did not seek any relief which
was not inherent in plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiffs in this case obtained a judgment that they were
entitled to some offsets, although the offsets were not as great
as claimed.

Defendant was awarded a judgment, but only for that
5

which had been offered in plaintiffs1 complaint—payment of the
promissory note less offsets.2

Plaintiffs were the prevailing

party, and should be awarded their attorney fees,
CONCLUSION
The "net judgment11 rule should not be applied to a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of offsets against
a promissory note, where the unpaid balance, although not then
due, is deposited in court at the inception of the lawsuit.

NBA

recovered nothing by its counterclaim—the relief it received
was inherent in Mountain States' complaint.
This Court should grant the petition for rehearing, and
should determine that plaintiff was the prevailing party as a
matter of law.
DATED this 5th day of July, 1989.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2

As shown on the attached amortization schedule, the amount
deposited into court actually overpaid the promissory note.
Mountain States should be entitled to a refund from NBA.
This amortization is based on the fact that the entire
$89,587.16 was deposited in court at the time the complaint was
filed in May, 1983. Although the trial court treated $30,000.00
of the total as having been deposited in January, 1984, the
$30,000.00 paid in January, 1984, was not new money, but just
replaced the check which had been deposited earlier. (The trial
court's findings on this issue conflict. Finding no. 24 states
the $30,000.00 was paid on July 24, 1984. Finding no. 27 states
the $30,000.00 was paid on January 25, 1984. (R. 318-19.)) The
check for $89,587.16 was not withdrawn until after the
$30,000.00 had been deposited.
6

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
5th day of July, 1989.
Stephen L. Henriod
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX "A"
Mountain States Broadcasting Co, v. Neale,
Case No, 880192-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1989).

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Mountain States Broadcasting
Company/ a corporation/ and
Dan Lacy, an individual/
Plaintiffs/ Appellants and
Cross-Respondents/
v.

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 880192-CA

Sterrett Neale and Neale
Broadcast Alliance/
Defendants, Respondents and
Cross-Appellants•

FILED
'NOOOMI

Fourth District/ Utah County
The Honorable Boyd L. Park
Attorneys:

f t * Court
U*r» Court •* Apptrtt

Don R. Petersen, Leslie W. Slaugh# Provo, for
Appellants
Stephen L. Henriod/ Marilynn P. Fineshriber/ Salt
Lake City, for Respondents

Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and Orme.
ORME/ Judge:
This appeal arises from a dispute over the purchase of
two radio stations and their assets. Mountain States
Broadcasting Company/ the corporate purchaser/ and Dan Lacy,
Mountain States' president and guarantor of the promissory note
given for the purchase price, commenced this action seeking a
declaration of their entitlement to certain offsets against the
note balance otherwise due. Neale Broadcast Alliance ("NBA"),
the corporate seller, and Sterrett Neale, NBA's president and
guarantor of the seller's performance, were named as
defendants. NBA counterclaimed for the entire note balance.
Both parties successfully secured certain aspects of the relief
they sought, but now appeal various decisions of the trial
court. We affirm in substantial part, but reverse and remand
in limited respects.

FACTS
NBA owned and operated radio stations KONI and KTMP in
Utah County. On November 21, 1981, NBA agreed to sell these
stations to Mountain States,, and the parties entered into an
Asset Purchase Agreement. In June 1982, the sale transaction
closed and Mountain States delivered a promissory note for the
deferred portion of the purchase price to NBA. The purchase
agreement provided that NBA warranted "all of the personal
property listed in Schedule 2 which is presently in active use
in the operation of the Stations will be in good repair and
working order unless otherwise noted" on the schedule.
Following the closing, Dan Lacy inspected the premises of both
radio stations and the personal property found thereon. Lacy
compiled a list of items mentioned on Schedule 2 that were, in
his opinion, either missing or inoperable. Accordingly,
Mountain States claimed a substantial offset against the note
balance.
After making two small payments on the note, Mountain
States and Lacy brought this action seeking a judicial
determination of their entitlement to the claimed offsets for
the allegedly missing or inoperable equipment. Mountain States
deposited a check for $89,587.16, the balance then due on the
note, with the court.1 NBA disputed the propriety of any
offset and counterclaimed for the entire amount due and owing
on the note, including interest.
Following a bench trial, the court found that the items
claimed to be missing were either excluded from the sale or had
been found, so that "no material items" were missing. However,
the court found that a "control design brain" and two carousels
used in the operation of the stations were not in "good repair
and working order" at the time of transfer. Accordingly, the
court awarded Mountain States an offset of $6,000, the
approximate amount the court concluded was necessary to restore
those items to the condition warranted.
NBA was awarded a judgment on its counterclaim for the
entire amount due on the note, less the offset. Relying on
1. At a subsequent hearing convened for another purpose, it
was agreed that the trial court would return this check to
Mountain States, which would then immediately pay $59,587.16 to
NBA and deposit the remaining $30,000 to an interest-bearing
account pending resolution of the dispute.

880192-CA
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language in the promissory note, the court concluded that
interest due on the unpaid balance should be compounded
monthly. Finding each side had prevailed to some extent, the
trial court also awarded both sides their attorney fees in
full.
On appeal, Mountain States claims: 1) It is entitled to
further offsets against the purchase price to compensate for
missing or inoperable equipment or to reflect the proper
measure of damages; 2) the court erred in compounding the
interest on unpaid interest installments; and 3) the court
erred in awarding both sides attorney fees because only
plaintiffs were "the prevailing party" as contemplated by the
purchase agreement.2
NBA cross-appeals, challenging the propriety of any
offset and claiming that they, not plaintiffs, are entitled to
attorney fees as "the prevailing party."
MISSING AND INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT
The parties1 claims concerning the proper offset amount
are essentially a challenge to the trial court's findings of
fact. Specifically, Mountain States argues the findings
concerning the amounts attributable to missing and inoperable
equipment are not supported by the evidence but are instead
significantly higher. NBA argues the evidence does not support
the findings in support of even a $6000 offset.
2. Mountain States also claims the trial court erred by
denying its claim for consequential damages relating to extra
payroll expense incurred by reason of the control design
brain's "inoperable" condition. We agree with the trial court
that Mountain States failed to meet its burden of proving that,
but for the condition of the control design brain, those
expenses would not have been necessary.
Mountain States also objects to the trial court's
post-trial amendment of the judgment to permit disbursement of
the deposited funds to Sterrett Neale personally rather than
directly to NBA. The court granted the motion to amend the
judgment ex parte, apparently regarding this modification as
merely clerical in nature. While we agree that the court
should have allowed Mountain States sufficient time to respond
to the motion, its failure to do so is harmless error in light
of our decision favorable to defendants.

880192-CA
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In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact/ a
party -must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,• thus making them "clearly
erroneous.'- In re Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1989)
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987). See also, e.g., Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d
465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Appellants often overlook or
disregard this heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is not
properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid.
See, e.g.. Deeben v. Deeben. 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 57 n.l
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960,
963 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); West Vallev Citv v. Borreoo, 752 P.2d
361, 364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield,
744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Harker v. Condominiums
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Here, the parties have done an admirable job of marshaling the
evidence. Indeed, the benefits of the requirement are
demonstrated by the fact that Mountain States, after its .
careful review of the evidence, candidly concedes the adequacy
of the evidence to support the. findings as to all but five of
its original claims for missing or inoperable equipment.
Furthermore, Mountain States' five remaining challenges are
well supported by precise and thorough references to record
evidence supporting the particular finding as well as evidence
supporting Mountain States' challenge. Accordingly, we turn to
the merits of those challenges.
After carefully reviewing the marshalled evidence, we
conclude the trial court's factual findings regarding the
alleged missing equipment are sufficiently supported by the
evidence, with only two minor exceptions. We have been shown
no evidence on which the trial court could have relied in
denying the claims for the missing oscilloscope and a noise and
distortion meter. Thus, we hold on the undisputed evidence in
the record that Mountain States is entitled to additional
offsets in the amount of $120 for the oscilloscope and $377.80
for the noise and distortion meter.
Additionally, both Mountain States and NBA challenge the
trial court's findings supporting its award of damages to
Mountain States for inoperable equipment. The evidence readily
supports the majority of the findings in this regard, but those
concerning the control design brain and two carousels present

880192-CA
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closer questions. Mountain States claims the $3/000 award
based on the cost to repair the control design brain is
insufficient as the evidence demonstrates that the brain is
beyond repair. Thus, Mountain States contends replacement cost
is the appropriate measure of its damages. On the other hand,
NBA contends the evidence demonstrates the control design brain
and carousels were as warranted and the court should not have
awarded any such damages to Mountain States.
The court received a wide range of testimony regarding
the condition of the control design brain and carousels.
However, the evidence does not compel a finding that the
equipment was beyond repair, as Mountain States contends, nor
that it was in the condition warranted at the time of sale, as
NBA contends. The middle ground taken by the trial .court,
namely that this equipment was not as warranted but could be
repaired, has ample evidentiary support. Of course, in view of
the divergent positions taken by the parties at trial, the
evidence concerning repair costs is somewhat sparse. It
appears that in formulating its ultimate award, the court
relied on an evaluation report prepared by an electronics
technician suggesting approximate repair costs.3 The award
is consistent with the estimates contained in the report.
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support the court's award
to Mountain States of a $6000 offset for equipment in
disrepair, and we affirm it.
INTEREST
Mountain States next contends the trial court erred in
awarding compound interest to NBA on the unpaid interest
3. Hoping to persuade us to adopt replacement cost as the
measure of its damages, Mountain States argues this document
should not be considered by us because it was not admitted as
evidence of repair costs. However, our attention is drawn to
no indication in the record that the court admitted the
document for a limited purpose, nor to any objection by
Mountain States to the document's admission for particular
purposes. In view of our affirmation of repair cost as the
appropriate measure of damages in this case, we note that if
this evidence were disregarded, this offset in favor of
Mountain States would have to be set aside altogether. No
other evidence in the record bears on the cost to repair this
equipment.

880192-CA
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installments. See generally 45 Am.Jur.2d Interest and Usury
§ 76 (1969) (-Compound interest means interest on interest, in
that accrued interest is added periodically to the principal,
and interest is computed upon the new principal thus formed; it
is to be distinguished from the mere allowance of interest on
overdue installments of interest/ which is not strictly
compound interest.-). The court relied on the following
provision in the promissory note as the basis for its award:
This Note shall bear interest upon
the unpaid principal balance hereof from
the date hereof until paid, at a rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum. Should
interest not be paid when due, it shall
thereafter bear like interest as the
principal.
In Utah/ compound interest is not favored by the law.
Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613/ 616 (Utah 1979) (per
curiam). The court1s award here can be affirmed only if we
conclude the parties expressly agreed to compound interest by
the terms of the above provision. In this regard/ we observe
that the note does not explicitly provide that interest on
unpaid interest should be compounded monthly.4 Instead/ it
provides that unpaid interest will bear interest "as the
principal/- which bears simple interest. Therefore/ we hold
NBA is only entitled to simple interest at a rate of 10% per
annum on the unpaid interest installments/ and we remand to the
trial court to recalculate the interest due.5
4. ££. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961(b) (1989) (expressly providing for
interest -compounded annually-).
5. A close reading of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320/ 145
P. 1036 (1915)/ relied on by NBA# reveals the Court's intention
that the unpaid interest earn interest/ but it is not clear it
intended the interest upon the interest to bear interest. T£.
at 1041. The interpretation favoring simple interest is
supported by the overall result in Jensen. The interest
payments in that case were $175 per month. The Court said:
When therefore the several sums of $175/
with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per
cent per annum from the date they
severally became due until the judgment
was entered as aforesaid, are all added to

880192-CA
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ATTORNEY FEES
Mountain States and NBA also challenge the trial court's
award granting both sides their attorney fees based on the
attorney fee provision in the Asset Purchase Agreement.6
That provision provides in part, with our emphasis, as follows:
In the event of commencement of suit by
either party to enforce the provisions of
this Agreement, £hg prevailing party shall
be entitled to receive attorneys' fees and
costs as a court may adjudge reasonable in
addition to any other relief granted.
Attorney fees are awardable only if provided for by statute
or contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by
its terms. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d
(Footnote 5 continued)
the principal, the total amount is the
amount for which judgment should be
entered.
Id. If the Court had intended the missed interest installments
to bear compounded interest, these particular installments
would have been added to the principal once overdue, rather
than making sure they existed as "several sums of $175" and
waiting until judgment to add them to the principal.
Furthermore, the provision in Jensen is distinguishable from
the provision at issue here.
6. There are actually three attorney fee provisions in the
record. The individual guaranty of Dan Lacy provides that Lacy
will "reimburse Neale for all costs and expenses including
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of this guaranty."
Since the trial court had no occasion to award NBA a judgment
on the guaranty, we need not consider this provision.
The promissory note also provides that "[t]he undersigned
[Mountain States] promises to pay costs of collection and
attorneys' fees in reasonable amount if default is made in the
payment of this Note." Because NBA is the party due fees under
this provision and also, as we will explain, the "prevailing
party" under the fees provision in the purchase agreement, we
need not separately consider the note provision, which is
merely duplicative given the posture of this case.

880192-CA

7

985, 988 (Utah 1988). As the award of fees here is based on a
contract, we must determine if the trial court properly
concluded that both parties "prevailed- and were therefore
entitled to fees under the contract. Both sides argue the fee
provision mandates that there can be only one -prevailing
party,- an interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of
the provision, particularly its reference in the singular to
"the prevailing party.- Of course, both claim to be that
party.
Typically, determining the -prevailing party- for purposes
of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues
defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded a
judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant
has prevailed. However, this simple analysis cannot* be
employed here because both plaintiff and defendant obtained
some monetary relief against the other.7 Our review of the
relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at
issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both
plaintiff and defendant are awarded money damages on claims
arising from the same transaction.8 See Lawrence v. Peel, 45
7. The determination of a -prevailing party- becomes even more
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties, see
Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co.. 152 Ariz. 455, 733
P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1986); the granting of non-monetary relief
to one or more parties, see Watson Constr. Co. v. Amfac
Mortgage Corp.. 124 Ariz. 570, 606 P.2d 421, 435-36 (Ct. App.
1979); Food Pantrv, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc.. 58
Haw. 606, 575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978); and where the ultimate
award of money daraagfes does not adequately represent the actual
success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case.
&£2 Owen Jones & Sons. Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,
313-14 (Alaska 1972). These cases demonstrate the need for a
flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases
who actually is the -prevailing party.8. It appears that where both plaintiff and defendant recover
in the same action but the counterclaim does not arise from the
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim, both parties may be
considered to have prevailed and, therefore, to be entitled to
a portion of their fees. See, e.g., Elder v. Triax Co., 740
P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah 1987); Moran v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 680,
41 A.2d 905, 905 (1945). However, this rule would not apply
here because Mountain States' claim and NBA's counterclaim
arose from the same transaction.

880192-CA
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Or. App. 233, 607 P.2d 1386, 1392 (1980); Marauam Inv. Corp. v.
Mvers, 35 Or. App. 23, 581 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1978). See also
Checketts v. Collinas, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (Utah 1931)
("There can be but one prevailing party in an action at law to
recover a money judgment.-).9 But see Travner v. Cushino,
688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (both sides entitled
to award of some attorney fees where relevant agreement did not
employ -prevailing party" phraseology). We hold that in the
present circumstances the party in whose favor the -netjudgment is entered must be considered the -prevailing party"
and is entitled to an award of its fees. See, e.g., Ocean West
Contractors. Inc. v. Halec Constr. Co.. 123 Ariz. 470, 600 P.2d
1102, 1105 (1979); Trollooe v. Koerner, 21 Ariz. App. 43, 515
P.2d 340, 344 (1973); Moss Constr. Co. v. Wulffsohn, 116 Cal.
App. 2d 203, 253 P.2d 483, 485 (1953); Szoboszlay v. Glessner.
233 Kan. 475, 664 P.2d 1327, 1333-35 (1983); E.C.A. Envtl.
Management Servs., Inc. v. Toenves, 208 Mont. 336, 679 P.2d
213, 218 (1984). £££ slS& Annotation, Who XS The -Successful
Party" Or "Prevailing Party" For Purposes Of Awarding Costs
Where Both Parties Prevail On Affirmative Claims, 66 A.L.R.3d
1115 (1975).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that NBA, in view of
its net recovery of approximately $85,000, is the sole
"prevailing party" as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse
the award of fees to Mountain States. Even though we affirm
NBA's entitlement to an award of attorney fees, we must reverse
the award as made and remand for a determination of a

reasonable fee. 1 0

sssflossCogstr, Cot/ 253 P.2d at 484-85.

9. We note the limited reliance we purposefully place on
Checketts. While we agree that there can be but one
"prevailing party* in an action such as this, we think that the
result reached in Checketts, to the effect that a defendant who
defeats a plaintiff's claim, but also loses on its
counterclaim, is the "prevailing party" entitled to fees as a
matter of course, 1 P.2d at 953, makes little sense and is
probably no longer valid.
10.
The trial court in this case, in awarding fees to both
sides, simply awarded each the total amount of its accumulated
billing statements. *On remand, the trial court's calculation
of a reasonable fee should comport with Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Utah 1988). Of course, a
reasonable fee will compensate NBA only for those fees
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues in NBA's favor,
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Finally, plaintiffs argue that they acknowledged owing a
portion of the debt both before the action was commenced and,
subsequently, at an early stage of the action. See note 1,
supra. Additionally, they note that they deposited the entire
sum due into court. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend NBA cannot
be deemed to have "prevailed," at least as to the amount never
seriously contested by Mountain States. We cannot agree, and
hold that NBA has "prevailed" to the extent of its entire
recovery, including the amount Mountain States voluntarily paid
after NBA filed its counterclaim. See Highland Constr. Co. v.
Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981) (for purposes of an
award of fees to the "prevailing party," sums voluntarily paid
during the course of the action are treated as if obtained by
judgment). ££. Maher v. Gacrne. 448 U.S. 122, 100 S. Ct. 2570,
2575 (1980) (a party has "prevailed" for purposes of awarding
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even if resolution of its claim is
through settlement).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's $6,000 award to Mountain States as an
offset for missing or inoperable equipment is affirmed, but
must be increased by $120 for the missing oscilloscope and
$377.80 for the missing noise and distortion meter. The
court's award of compound interest is reversed. Finally, the
court's award of attorney fees to both parties is reversed. On
remand, then, the trial court must determine and enter an award
of reasonable attorney fees in NBA's favor, increase the offset
in favor of Mountain States as indicated, and recalculate
interest to award NBA only simple interest on the interest
(Footnote 10 continued)
and should not include fees relating to the issues resolved in
Mountain States' favor. Sg£ Stacev Properties v. Wixen, 766
P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (party entitled to
attorney fees "was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on
which it was successful"). ££. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools,
Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80
(Utah 1988) (suggesting need to "differentiate between the time
spent on the successful claim[s] and the time spent on
unsuccessful claims" and propriety of awarding fees only for
the former); Travner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)
(per curiam) ("[A] party is entitled only to those fees
attributable to the successful vindication of contractual
rights within the terms of their agreement.").
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installments not paid when due. Additionally, NBA, while not
enjoying total success on this appeal, is clearly the
"prevailing party," and is entitled on remand to an award of
its attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.11 See
Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09
(Utah 1980).

Gregoiar K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

C^L/(Z

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

11. Of course, the point made in footnote 10 about the
recoverable aspects of NBAfs overall attorney fee applies with
equal force to the reasonable fee awardable on remand for
attorney services rendered on appeal.
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APPENDIX "B"
Amortization Schedule

MOUNTAIN STATES BROADCASTING COPRORATION
r T

vS

NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE —
Orxginal Note Amount

$90,929.99
6,497.00

Court Directed Offset
New Note Amount
TERM OF LOAN —
Date

120 Months

^dd Interest

7-30-32
703.50
^ 30 davs at 23.45/day,>
8-30-82'
703.50
703.50
9-30-82
10-1-82
10-30-82
701.10
(30 days at 23.37/day)
11-30-82
701.10
12-1-82
12-30-82
702.90
(30 days at 23.43/day)
1-30-83
702.90
2-28-83
702.90
3-30-83
702.90
4-30-83
702.90
5-5-83
140.58
(6 days at
< 23.43/day)
5-5-33
5-5-84
159.13
5-5-85
175.05
5-5-86
192.55
5-5-87
211.81
5-5-88
232.99
5-5-89
256.29
7-1-89
42.90
(55 days at $.78/day)

$84,432.99
INTEREST RATE —

10% Per Annum

Subtract Payments

Balance
85,136.49

2,403.30

35,839.99
86,543.49
84,140.19
84,841.29

1,201.65

85,542.39
84,340.74
85,043.64
85,746.54
86,449.44
87,152.34
87,855.24
87,995.82

89,587.16

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

1,591.34
1,750.47
1,925.52
2,118.07
2,329.88
2,562.87
2,819.16
2,862.06

Interest accrues thru 5-5-90 at $.78/day or $23.40/month

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

